Arms Diffusion and War by Bas, Muhammet Ali & Coe, A. J.
Arms Diffusion and War
The Harvard community has made this
article openly available.  Please share  how
this access benefits you. Your story matters
Citation Bas, M. A., and A. J. Coe. 2012. “Arms Diffusion and War.”
Journal of Conflict Resolution 56 (4) (May 21): 651–674.
doi:10.1177/0022002712445740.
Published Version doi:10.1177/0022002712445740
Citable link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:22547793
Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University’s DASH
repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions
applicable to Open Access Policy Articles, as set forth at http://
nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-
use#OAP
Arms Diﬀusion and War
Muhammet A. Bas and Andrew J. Coe∗
Department of Government
Harvard University
Accepted for Publication at the Journal of Conﬂict Resolution
November 15, 2011
Abstract
We present a model of the relationship between the spread of new military tech-
nologies and the occurrence of war. A new technology could shift the balance of power,
causing anticipatory war as one side tries to prevent the other from obtaining it. When
one side already has it, war is more likely when the shift in power is large, likely, and
durable. When neither side has it, war is more likely when the expected shift is asym-
metric (e.g., one side is more likely to get it) and when the two sides fear that a war will
occur once one of them has it. We illustrate the model with historical examples from
the spread of ﬁrearms (the Musket Wars in pre-colonial New Zealand) and of nuclear
weapons (the end of US nuclear monopoly, and the 1967 Six-Day War). A broader
implication is that major power competition can unintentionally cause wars elsewhere.
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are grateful to Amy Catalinac, Alexandre Debs, Jeﬀry Frieden, Nuno Monteiro, Robert Powell, Jonathan
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Joint Speaker Series at the University of California, San Diego; the Peter D. Watson Seminar Series at the
University of Rochester; and the International Relations Workshop at Yale University, where we presented
earlier versions of this paper.
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1 Introduction
Sitting at his desk in June of 1946, President Harry S. Truman wrote a note to himself: “Get
plenty of Atomic Bombs on hand—drop one on Stalin, put the United Nations to work, and
eventually set up a free world.”1 Though the United States was then the sole possessor of
nuclear weapons, Truman was well-aware that the Soviet Union was hard at work trying
to copy the US invention, and that other states might follow suit. Indeed, only three years
later, the Soviets would test their own atomic bomb, to Truman’s great dismay. Yet Truman
did nothing to stop it. Why?
The invention of new military technology is often followed by its diﬀusion around the
world, and the introduction of the associated weapons into new locales is sometimes, though
not always, attended by war. The spread of ﬁrearms to pre-colonial populations in the 18th
and 19th centuries was concomitant with intense warfare among these groups, and the spread
of nuclear weapons in the 20th and 21st centuries has also been marred by occasional wars.
Were some of these wars caused by arms diﬀusion? If so, why did wars result in some cases
but not others? How does the occurrence of war depend on the characteristics of the new
weapons, and of the states to which they could spread? In particular, why was Truman
content to bide his time while the Soviets got the bomb?
We explore these questions using a game-theoretic model of bargaining between two states
in an environment in which new technologies are spreading.2 In the model, the acquisition
of a new technology can shift the balance of military power between the two states. The
likelihood of a state acquiring the new technology depends on its technological sophistication
and its competence in espionage; the magnitude of the resulting shift depends on the speciﬁc
technology and on the pre-existing military capabilities of the two states. Over time, a state
1The quote is taken from Trachtenberg (2007).
2We use “states” as a shorthand for organized groups, which are assumed to be unitary actors, whether
they be nations or, as in one of our illustrative cases, tribes.
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may become more likely to acquire a particular technology, as the weapons’ external spread,
the state’s spying eﬀorts, and/or its internal development progress. And the introduction of
new technologies may recur over time.
We ﬁnd that states’ inability to commit to not taking advantage of their new weapons
can, under certain conditions, lead to a preventive war aimed at stopping a state from getting
the new technology. States’ expectations about the future are critical in determining whether
war occurs. We show that war is more likely when the expected shift in relative power is
large, likely, and durable, in line with the arguments of scholars of the preventive motivation
for war (Taylor, 1954; Levy, 1987; Copeland, 2000; Levy, 2008). More surprisingly, we ﬁnd
that war can occur when neither, one, or both have acquired a new technology: the common-
sense intuition that the preventive motivation for war will be highest when one state, but
not the other, possesses the new weapons is true only under certain conditions.
We also demonstrate that preventive war is more likely when states anticipate a greater
probability of war occurring in the future. Scholars of preventive war have long argued for
this proposition, but it has not appeared previously in the bargaining literature on war.3
This is because previous models of shifting power assume that all future shifts in the balance
of power will favor the same state. This is unrealistic with respect to arms diﬀusion; we relax
it and ﬁnd that the fear of future wars is a rational response to the possibilities created by
the spread of new weapons.
We illustrate the model by applying it to several examples drawn from the history of the
spread of ﬁrearms and of nuclear weapons. The introduction of each of these technologies
is commonly understood to have been highly consequential for states’ military capabilities,
and so each is a prime candidate for generating preventive wars or the consideration thereof
3Based on his model of bargaining in the face of shifting power, Fearon (1995) shows that “the declining
state attacks not because it fears being attacked in the future but because it fears the peace it will have to
accept after the rival has grown stronger” (p. 406). A similar result follows from the model of shifting power
given in Chapter 4 of Powell (1999).
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by states. We ﬁrst look at the introduction of ﬁrearms to Maori tribes in New Zealand
in the early 19th century, which was followed by the aptly named “Musket Wars.” This
series of unusually intense conﬂicts was initially characterized by tribes with newly acquired
muskets attempting to destroy or enslave tribes without muskets—for preventive reasons,
we will argue. Next, we examine the end of US nuclear monopoly, with the spread of nuclear
weapons to the Soviet Union in the late 1940s. Our model suggests, and there is some
evidence to support, that US hesitation to forcefully protect the monopoly was driven in
part by the (violated) expectation that it would be a long time before the Soviets could
successfully copy the bomb, in contrast to other accounts of this period that emphasize
US lack of preparedness for or moral qualms about war. Finally, we turn to the 1967 Six-
Day War, between Israel and Egypt (among others). Our model predicts that preventive
motivations with respect to Israel’s nuclear program should have played a part in the origins
of the war, supporting a recent and controversial line of historical work on this case.
Our model contributes to the formal literature that explains war with recourse to com-
mitment problems arising from exogenous shifts in the balance of power.4 Existing models in
this literature treat shifts in the balance of power as deterministic and perfectly anticipated,
whereas our model allows shifts to be stochastic and hence uncertain (Fearon, 1995; Powell,
1999, 2009). This gives rise to empirical implications diﬀerent from those of the deterministic
models: states’ war decisions turn on expectations about future shifts rather than the shifts
that will actually occur, and so states may sometimes consider or launch preventive attacks
even when no shift later occurs, and they may forego prevention even when a large shift later
occurs.
Our work is also related to models of endogenous shifts in the balance of power due to
4For a general characterization of commitment problems, see Powell (2004, 2006). The seminal catego-
rization of the rational causes of war is Fearon (1995). For a recent review of the formal literature on the
causes of war, see Jackson and Morelli (2009a).
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arming (Powell, 1993; Meirowitz and Sartori, 2008; Baliga and Sjo¨stro¨m, 2008; Jackson and
Morelli, 2009b; Debs and Monteiro, 2010). In particular, Baliga and Sjo¨stro¨m (2008) and
Debs and Monteiro (2010) deal explicitly with the situation in which one state has the option
of investing in acquiring a new military technology. Both models allow only one opportunity
for the balance of power to shift, whereas our model allows both multiple opportunities
for a given shift and multiple shifts as ﬁrst one side, then the other tries to acquire a new
technology. The cost of this additional generality is that, for tractability, we assume the
shifts are exogenous, and as a result cannot assess the role of secrecy and ambiguity in
a state’s decision to pursue the new technology, which is the central concern of the cited
models. However, we can study the role of secrecy about the progress a state is making
toward acquiring a new technology, given that its decision to do so is known. In so doing, we
shed light on an aspect of secrecy ignored by those models.5 Additionally, we can analyze
the situation in which neither side has the technology and also study the eﬀects of recurring
technological diﬀusion. We thus view our work as complementary to prior eﬀorts.
Finally, our study is more loosely related to a line of research focused on the determinants
of successful incorporation and application of new technology by nations’ militaries. Most
recently, Horowitz (2010) oﬀers a theory of diﬀusion based on states’ ﬁnancial and organi-
zational capacities for adopting innovations.6 Our focus is not on the causes of diﬀusion,
but rather its eﬀects, and speciﬁcally its potential to cause preventive wars as one side tries
to stop the other from successfully adopting a new technology. We parameterize the ability
of states to copy a new technology, and then study how the value of this parameter aﬀects
the occurrence of war, while the research of Horowitz (2010) and others is concerned with
5In the models of Baliga and Sjo¨stro¨m (2008) and Debs and Monteiro (2010), a proliferant may have
incentives to hide the existence of its program, but once the other side is aware of it, there is no further
gain from secrecy because the game is eﬀectively over—the proliferant is only allowed to have one try at
developing the weapons in these ﬁnite-time models.
6This research extends earlier work on the determinants of successful military innovation, such as Posen
(1984) and Rosen (1991).
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determining the value of this parameter for particular states at particular times.
In the next section, we describe the model and the assumptions we make. Section 3
characterizes the equilibria of the model and derives comparative statics. We then turn to
the historical illustrations in Section 4, and Section 5 concludes.
2 Setup of the Model
We model the interaction between two states (or groups), A and B, as they bargain over
the division of an inﬁnite ﬂow of beneﬁts, represented by the unit interval. The players
alternate in discrete time between making and responding to proposals for revision of the
status quo over the course of potentially inﬁnitely many periods, with one oﬀer per period.
If the receiving player accepts the proposal, the revision is implemented immediately. If
he rejects the oﬀer peacefully, the status quo division is maintained. Finally, the receiving
player can respond by starting a war, in which case the game ends with a costly lottery.7
The value of this lottery to each player depends on the balance of military power between
them, represented by A’s probability of victory in war. The winner receives the entire stake
in this and all future rounds; the loser gets nothing. Regardless of who wins, each player
pays a positive cost, cA and cB respectively, in this and all future periods, which represents
the destructiveness of the war.8
In any given round, a peaceful response to an oﬀer (whether acceptance or rejection) is
7This model, like those following Fearon (1995) in the bargaining theory of war, is inspired by the model of
bargaining analyzed in Rubinstein (1982) and extended to include outside options (such as war) in Binmore,
Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1986).
8We could also give the players the option of launching a limited (i.e., non-game-ending) attack aimed at
temporarily lessening the probability of diﬀusion to the attacked side. Whether such an attack was preferred
to a decisive preventive war in equilibrium would depend only on its relative cost-eﬀectiveness—a limited
attack would presumably be less destructive, but might have to be repeated over time, and might be more
or less likely to succeed than a full-on war. However, costly ﬁghting, whether limited attack or decisive war,
would occur for the same reasons as those we identify here, so we ignore the possibility of a limited attack
for simplicity.
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followed by a move by Nature which determines whether a new military technology diﬀuses
to each player. In the Maori case, this can be thought of as the arrival (or not) of a European
ship bearing ﬁrearms for trade; in the case of the initial spread of nuclear weapons, this is the
success (or not) of the Soviet Union’s development program. We assume that this process is
exogenous—the players have no control over the occurrence of diﬀusion.
This assumption requires some justiﬁcation. For it to be a reasonable approximation, two
conditions must be met: ﬁrst, the cost in terms of resources of acquiring the new technology
must be outweighed by the beneﬁts, and second, agreements by which the players avoid
both diﬀusion and war via arms control must be unenforceable. The ﬁrst condition means
that the new technology cannot be too expensive relative to the gains it brings in terms
of the acquiring player’s bargaining power over the interests at stake between the players.
Certainly, this condition holds in many empirical cases, including the three discussed in the
next section. The Maori tribes, and the Soviet Union and Israel, had much to gain over
their adversaries from acquiring ﬁrearms and nuclear weapons, respectively. For the Maori,
ﬁrearms were cheap as Europeans were willing to trade them for goods the Maori had in
abundance. And the Soviet Union’s size and Israel’s wealth meant that each could aﬀord to
devote the necessary resources to developing nuclear weapons.
The second condition means that the players cannot monitor each other’s attempts to
acquire the new technology well enough to prevent cheating on an arms control agreement.
This condition also holds in many empirical cases, including the three discussed here. Once
European ships had landed at a particular point along the coast, nothing could be done
to stop the nearest tribe from obtaining ﬁrearms, and there was no way to anticipate these
landings. And the US and Egyptian capabilities for monitoring the Soviet and Israeli nuclear
programs (respectively) were quite rudimentary, as we will document in the next section.
Thus, both conditions are met in many empirical cases and thus, for these cases, our as-
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sumption of exogenous diﬀusion is reasonable.9
If a player receives the technology, the balance of power shifts. Before either has the
technology, the balance of power (A’s probability of victory in war) is p00; when A has it
but B does not, the balance is p10 and similarly for p01; and when both have it, the balance
is p11. Naturally, we assume that p01 < p00 < p10 and p01 < p11 < p10, so that unilateral
possession of the technology is advantageous in war, relative to mutual acquisition or mutual
lack of the technology. However, we allow p00 to diﬀer from p11. If, for example, state A has
conventional forces superior to those of state B, but both have acquired nuclear weapons,
then conventional arms may be of reduced importance in determining the overall balance.
We assume that the balance of power (variously p00, p10, p01, and p11) is also exogenous:
the division of the ﬂow of beneﬁts does not aﬀect it and the players cannot otherwise alter
it. This allows comparison of our results with the extant literature on exogenous shifts in
power, and preserves the model’s tractability. Substantively, it means that we are assuming
that measures to aﬀect the balance of power—principally arming or transfers of resources
(e.g., territory) that aﬀect the balance—are unavailable, insuﬃciently eﬀective, or too costly
to be used by the players.
This assumption also merits some justiﬁcation. First, consider arming. We will show
below that only new technologies that have a suﬃciently large eﬀect on the balance of power
might cause war. When this eﬀect is large enough, additional arming by one side will not
be enough to counteract the shift in the balance that occurs when the other obtains the
9Baliga and Sjo¨stro¨m (2008) and Debs and Monteiro (2010) endogenize a player’s choice of whether to
attempt to acquire nuclear weapons, and show that this can lead to equilibria where the player mixes over
attempting and not, and the other player mixes over attacking and not. That is, equilibrium behavior may
result in uncertainty over whether a nuclear program exists. However, this did not occur in the historical
cases we consider: the US knew with certainty about the Soviet nuclear program, and Egypt knew about
Israel’s nuclear program, long before either program was successful. The key uncertainty in these cases is
about the progress a state is making, not about whether it is trying. Our model incorporates this uncertainty,
since success in acquiring the new technology is stochastic and may take many rounds of attempts, but we
must abstract away from the choice over whether to keep trying for the sake of tractability.
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new technology. This held for all three of our examples from the history of the diﬀusion
of ﬁrearms and nuclear weapons, and probably more generally for such consequential tech-
nologies. A Maori tribe without ﬁrearms could not muster enough additional manpower and
crude weapons to maintain the balance against another that had acquired guns; the United
States and Egypt could not sustainably arm themselves suﬃciently to preserve the balance
of power against the Soviet Union’s or Israel’s acquisition of nuclear weapons. The implica-
tion is that in the cases where our theory predicts war, compensatory arming will not suﬃce
to prevent the anticipated shift in power that causes it. By contrast, for less consequential
technologies, arming might suﬃce to counteract the anticipated shift, but our theory would
predict peace in those cases anyway.
Second, consider transfers of resources. These would have to be conceded by the side
that expected the balance of power to shift in its favor due to diﬀusion, to the side that
expected to be disadvantaged. For this reason and unlike arming, the transfers could not
be made after diﬀusion had occurred, because, as we show in Proposition 1 below, after
diﬀusion the disadvantaged side would not have a credible war threat and so could not
then coerce the advantaged side into making the concession. By contrast, transfers made
before diﬀusion had occurred would not eliminate the anticipated shift in the balance of
power due to diﬀusion—they would simply alter the baseline balance of power from which
the players start. Thus, after the transfer was made, the same side would still expect to be
disadvantaged by diﬀusion, and would demand yet another transfer as compensation to avoid
war. For technologies whose diﬀusion would substantially alter the prior balance of power,
the necessary transfers would be large and would quickly threaten the continued existence
of the conceding side, and thus would not be made. The smaller transfers necessary to
compensate for a less consequential technology’s diﬀusion might be agreeable, but again, our
theory predicts peace in these cases anyway. Thus, incorporating arming, transfers, or both
into our model would not alter the main qualitative results of our analysis.
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The probability of diﬀusion depends on whether the other state has acquired the tech-
nology. When neither has it, A’s probability of receiving it in the next round is λA, and
similarly for λB. These are allowed to diﬀer as a proxy for diﬀerent levels of susceptibility
to diﬀusion between the two states. For example, two states with economies of diﬀering
technological sophistication may have diﬀerent probabilities of initial diﬀusion. If A already
has the technology, then the probability that B will receive the technology in the next round
is λAB, and similarly for λBA. We assume λAB ≥ λB and λBA ≥ λA: once one state has the
technology, the other state is (weakly) more likely to receive it. This is plausible because
the latter state now knows the technology is available and feasible and this may guide its
eﬀorts to duplicate it. Moreover, once one state has the technology, the other may employ
espionage against the former and eventually steal the technology.
As a simpliﬁcation, we typically assume that the various λ’s do not change over time.
That is, if a player does not receive the new technology in this round, then his chance of
acquiring it in the next is the same, so long as the other player does not receive it in this
round. So, the per-period chance of diﬀusion is not cumulative, even though the ex ante
probability of diﬀusion occurring over the next several periods in increasing in the number
of periods considered. This assumption is less applicable in the case of the spread of nuclear
weapons. We relax it in Section 3.3, allowing λ to increase over time, and discuss the
diﬀerences this introduces.
Finally, we assume that there is only one new technology available. That is, once a
player has received the technology, there is no other new technology to be acquired that
could again shift the balance in his favor. This assumption greatly simpliﬁes the exposition
of the analysis, but it is unrealistic. We show in the appendix that relaxing this assumption
does not alter the qualitative character of our results.
A player’s utility is assumed to be linear in present consumption, deﬁned as the player’s
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share of the contested stake. Settlements are labeled by the share going to A: the settlement
in which A receives q and B receives 1− q is called q. The players are assumed to discount
future consumption at a common rate of δ < 1 per period. Players’ preferences and all the
exogenous parameters of the game are common knowledge.
3 Equilibrium Analysis
We use backward induction to ﬁnd the subgame perfect equilibria (SPE) of the model, which
requires players’ strategies to be optimal in every subgame. We will show that the subgame
in which both players have the technology, which we term “mutual armament,” has a unique
equilibrium outcome given the status quo division with which the players start. We then
turn to the prior subgame in which one player has the technology but the other does not,
called “diﬀusion.”10 We establish the conditions under which war occurs in SPE, and derive
comparative statics for the various parameters. Next, we relax the assumption that the
probabilities of diﬀusion are constant, analyzing the case in which they increase over time.
Finally, we analyze the ﬁrst subgame, in which neither player has the technology, which we
label “introduction.” Proofs of all the propositions are in the appendix.
3.1 Mutual Armament Subgame
We begin with the subgame where both players have the technology. Proposition 1 charac-
terizes the unique outcome of any SPE of this subgame. This result is essentially identical to
the results from the standard models of shifting power for the equilibrium outcome once the
shift has occurred, so we only remind readers of the intuition (Fearon, 1995; Powell, 1999).
10We only give a proof for the case where A has the technology but not B. The analysis for this subgame
is mirrored by that for the subgame where B but not A has the technology, and can be obtained by switching
labels.
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Proposition 1. Suppose that both players have the technology and that the status quo divi-
sion is q. No war will occur. If q < p11− cA, then a permanent revision to q′ = p10− cA will
be immediately agreed. If q > p11 + cB, then a permanent revision to q
′ = p11 + cB will be
immediately agreed. If q ∈ [p11 − cA, p11 + cB], there will be no revisions.
Intuitively, once both players have the technology, there is no longer any uncertainty
or any possibility of a future shift in the balance of power. The players can thus ﬁnd a
settlement that both prefer to war, and peace will prevail. Furthermore, aside perhaps from
a single, immediate revision to bring the status quo division of the disputed stake into line
with the balance of power, there is no cause for further revisions. The key comparative static
is that the higher p11 is, the better A (and the worse B) will expect to do once both players
have the technology.
3.2 Diﬀusion Subgame
Backing up, we assume that A has the technology, but B does not. Proposition 2 character-
izes the unique outcome of any SPE of this subgame.11 As we will explain, the mechanism
that leads to war here is the same as in the standard models of shifting power, but the
interpretation is diﬀerent.
Proposition 2. Suppose player A has the technology, but B does not. If p10 − cA +
δ
1−δλAB(p10 − p11) > 1 + δ1−δλAB(cA + cB), then there is war. Otherwise, there is peace,
and at most one revision to the status quo, which is immediately agreed.
11We assume that B makes the ﬁrst oﬀer in this subgame, so that A might attack B before he has a
chance of receiving the technology. If instead A made the ﬁrst oﬀer and the parameters were such that A
should attack B to prevent him from acquiring the technology, A would have to wait until the next round
to do so, during which time Nature might bestow the technology on B, thus rendering the game peaceful
by Proposition 1. This is a somewhat artiﬁcial possibility generated by the alternating-oﬀers bargaining
protocol: it is akin to saying that preventive war might be averted because the side without the technology
could receive it before the other side can mount an attack, even if the latter chose to do so immediately.
Assuming that B makes the ﬁrst oﬀer allows us to ignore it.
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The root cause of war is that B faces a commitment problem.12 He is likely to receive
the technology at some point in the future, and when he does, the balance of power will shift
in his favor. By Proposition 1, he will then demand and receive a revision that will bring
the status quo into line with the new balance of power, leaving him better oﬀ and A worse
oﬀ. B cannot commit himself ahead of time to not taking advantage of the technology once
he acquires it, so if he cannot buy A oﬀ by compensating him for the adverse shift to come,
then A will start a war in order to prevent the shift.
Anticipating this, A will demand a larger share of the stake now, as compensation for the
adverse shift to come. The largest compensation B could commit to would be to concede the
entire stake to A for every period until the shift occurs (after which B would take advantage
of the new balance of power and demand a revision). If the shift is suﬃciently likely and
suﬃciently large, then even this compensation is not enough: A would still prefer to go to
war in order to stop B from gaining an advantage. However, if the shift is not so likely or
so large, then B can successfully compensate A and the game is peaceful.
War can occur in this subgame because A has reason to fear the future: B will eventually
receive the new technology, and A’s temporary advantage deriving from its sole possession of
the technology will be lost. Whether the loss of this advantage will compel a preventive war
depends on how large the anticipated loss will be. The condition for war given in Proposition
2 implies that war can only occur when the anticipated shift in power (i.e., p10 − p11), is
larger than the total cost of war (cA + cB). If the shift is not this large, then war is so
destructive that its costs outweigh the beneﬁts to A of locking in his temporary advantage.
12To obtain the analogous result for the subgame in which B but not A has the technology, we just switch
labels, as in Proposition 3 below.
Proposition 3. Suppose player B has the technology, but A does not. If 1−p01−cB+ δ1−δλBA(p11−p01) >
1 + δ1−δλBA(cA + cB), then there is war. Otherwise, there is peace, and at most one revision to the status
quo, which is immediately agreed.
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However, unlike in the standard models in Fearon (1995) and Powell (1999), even a very
large shift in the balance of power due to the diﬀusion of the new technology is not suﬃcient
to cause war. If the shift is larger than the costs, whether war occurs or not also depends
on how likely the shift is to occur. It is clear from the condition in Proposition 2 that an
increase in the likelihood of the shift (λAB) makes war more likely. A has more reason to
launch a preventive war to the extent that his advantage will be lost sooner. But conversely,
if the chances of B acquiring the new technology are very low, then A will not start a war
even if diﬀusion would be highly consequential for the balance of power, because diﬀusion
will not happen any time soon.
The implication is that whether war occurs or not depends not only on the shift in power
that diﬀusion would bring, but also on A’s expectations about how likely diﬀusion is to
occur. We will delve further into this implication next.
3.3 Cumulative Diﬀusion
The analysis in the previous section assumed that the per-period probability of diﬀusion
(e.g., λAB) is constant over time. In reality, diﬀusion is typically increasingly likely to occur
over time. For example, the visits of the European traders to New Zealand became more
frequent over time, yielding an increasing probability that some new tribe would gain access
to muskets. And a state’s eﬀorts to acquire nuclear weapons usually have an increasing
chance of success as time goes by and progress in indigenous development, external assistance,
and/or espionage occurs. In this section, we study a variant of the model in which the
probability of diﬀusion increases over time, and show that the corresponding incentives for
preventive war also grow over time. We show that a state facing the possibility of diﬀusion
to another might choose to delay a preventive attack, putting oﬀ the costs of war until the
other side is close to acquiring the technology, even though this poses some risk of diﬀusion
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occurring unexpectedly early. The analysis also reveals why the acquiring state might conceal
its progress in duplicating the technology.
Suppose as in the previous section that player A has the new technology, but B does
not.13 The game here is identical to that of the previous section, except that λAB is now
an increasing function of time. To economize on notation, suppose that the game starts
at time t = 0, and that at time t, λAB = λt. We assume that λt is strictly increasing for
t ∈ {0, . . . , n} for some n < ∞, and is constant at λn thereafter.14
Proposition 4. Suppose player A has the technology, but B does not, and p10−p11 > cA+cB.
So long as B does not get it in the meantime, the value of war relative to peace for A increases
over time until period n, and is constant thereafter.
As in the previous section, the requirement that p10 − p11 > cA + cB ensures that there
is at least some incentive for preventive attack: it means that the advantage A has due to
sole possession of the technology is large enough to make it worth contemplating a costly
war to preserve it. If this condition didn’t hold, A wouldn’t attack regardless of the value
of λt—even if it were 1, so that B was certain to get the technology if A didn’t act to stop
it. Given the condition, the proposition shows that the case for A to attack gets stronger as
time passes and λt increases.
[Figure 1 about here.]
Figure 1 illustrates the intuition for the result. The values of λt control when B is
expected to get the new technology. If the ﬁrst few values of λt are low enough, A will
expect that it will be a long time before B ends its monopoly and so will have little reason
to worry about it. In particular, A will not attack in the early periods because he would
13The results for the reverse assumption can be obtained by switching labels.
14These assumptions simplify the exposition but do not aﬀect the qualitative character of the results,
which can easily be extended to the case of non-decreasing and/or asymptotic λt.
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rather put oﬀ the costs of preventive war until a later date. However, there is a trade-oﬀ
between avoiding the costs of war in the current period and taking the risk that B gets the
technology in the meantime. As time passes and λt grows, it becomes more likely that B
will get the technology very soon, and A has more cause to worry about the imminent loss
of its advantage. If λt gets high enough, those worries will overcome A’s desire to postpone
the costs of war and A will attack.
An implication of this is that B might get “lucky.” That is, it might be that B acquires
the technology faster than expected, while λt is relatively low, and before A is stirred to
act. This explains why states are sometimes surprised by diﬀusion, and why the state that
already had the technology would “let it happen.” In empirical cases where diﬀusion occurs
without preventive war, the explanation could be that the costs of preventive war were too
high, so that A would not attack even if diﬀusion was imminent and would let diﬀusion
occur. But our analysis suggests an alternative explanation: that A would have attacked
but missed its chance due to B’s luck, and so had no choice but to tolerate the shift. We
will develop this further in our discussion of the end of US nuclear monopoly.
The analysis also shows why a state trying to acquire the technology might conceal its
progress. Especially for diﬃcult technologies, concealment generates uncertainty on the part
of the state that has it about when the other will get it and can thus lower incentives for
prevention. To see why, consider two extreme cases. In the ﬁrst, A can perfectly observe
B’s progress. In the second, A sees nothing until the shift occurs.
In the ﬁrst case, since A has the technology and knows the steps involved in its devel-
opment, he will be able to tell exactly when B’s acquisition is imminent. That is, he can
watch as B’s eﬀorts progress and see when it reaches the verge of success. At that point,
the probability of diﬀusion is 1, and so A has the strongest possible incentive to attack then,
because if he does not, the balance of power will shift with certainty. Obviously this does
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not bode well for B. If A chose to attack, then B has no chance of acquiring the technology
and enjoying the beneﬁts of the resulting shift in power, and B will also have to pay the cost
of war.
If instead A couldn’t observe anything, he would always be uncertain about how far
B was from getting the technology. He would have to use his own experience with the
technology and his knowledge of B’s technological sophistication to estimate the probability
that B would acquire the technology in the next period, for each period: that is, he would
have to estimate the λt’s. A more diﬃcult technology would have more steps involved in its
acquisition, more possibilities for wrong turns, and more opportunities for delay as various
elements were mastered. It would thus lead A to assign a more diﬀuse distribution over
when B might be successful. Individual values of λt would be lower, and would rise more
slowly in t. Certainly, λt would not equal 1 in any period. Thus, at any time, the incentives
for preventive attack would be lower than in the previous case at the (known by A) time at
which diﬀusion was imminent.
It might be the case that the distribution was so spread out that A would not ever feel
an urgent need to attack, no matter how long it took B to be successful. Or, consistent with
Proposition 4, there might come a time when A would think that diﬀusion was close enough
(that is, λt was high enough) to warrant preventive attack. But the time that would pass
before that point would constitute time for B to get lucky. Thus, relative to the ﬁrst case,
B would have a higher chance of acquiring the technology and gaining the corresponding
advantage, as a well as a lower chance of having to pay the cost of war.
Most empirical cases would fall somewhere between these two extremes. A would have
some ability to observe B’s progress, and B would have some ability to conceal its eﬀorts.
But the comparison of the two extremes makes clear why secrecy would be beneﬁcial for B
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(and harmful to A) and surveillance beneﬁcial for A (and harmful to B).15
Previous models of shifting power did not produce these results because they assume
either that the shift is deterministic or that it can only occur at one point in time (Fearon,
1995; Powell, 1999; Baliga and Sjo¨stro¨m, 2008; Debs and Monteiro, 2010). When this is true,
B has incentives to try to conceal the existence of its eﬀorts at acquiring the new technology
from A, but there is no progress to speak of, so that once A knows of B’s program, there
is no more reason for secrecy. Either A attacks or he doesn’t—there is no possibility of
watching and waiting to attack until B is close to success, no possibility of B getting lucky
in the meantime, and no possibility of A regretting its delay.
Our model explains why one state might simply watch and wait as another attempts to
acquire a consequential new technology and to conceal its progress in doing so. The costs of
preventive war are not worth suﬀering until diﬀusion is near. Because of this, the acquiring
state will try to conceal its progress, so that the watching state is never certain that diﬀusion
is imminent, and might get lucky, successfully developing the technology before the watching
state acts to stop it.
3.4 Introduction Subgame
Finally we turn to the subgame in which neither player has received the new technology. We
ﬁrst assume that the eﬀects of the technology, should either or both players receive it, and
15The analysis is more complicated if B can send a message about its progress to A. If the message is
not independently veriﬁable by A, then it can only be informative in equilibrium if it varies in B’s actual
progress. Of course, B should say that progress is slow regardless of the truth, in order to minimize the
chance of a preventive attack. So the only equilibrium is a pooling one, in which B always sends the same
message, and it is thus ignored by A.
In the other extreme, if the message is perfectly veriﬁable (e.g., B allows comprehensive inspections by
A), then separation can occur in equilibrium. As time passes, if B’s progress is slow enough, revealing this
may be necessary to assure A that diﬀusion is not imminent and prevent an attack. If instead B’s progress
is rapid enough, then revealing this would increase the chance of attack, so B should reveal it later, if at all.
The general conclusion, that B should use concealment to delay preventive war, still holds.
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the probabilities of it diﬀusing to either or both players are common knowledge. Under this
assumption, we show that the outcome turns on the expected shift in the balance of power
and the probability of a preventive war occurring in the future. If these are large enough,
then the player who expects to lose in the future may ﬁght now to avoid the (expected)
shift and risk of future war. We then discuss what happens when this assumption is relaxed,
so that players are unable to perfectly forecast the “next” new technology. We argue that
uncertainty about the technological future makes war in the introduction subgame less likely.
To state the main result, we need some additional notation. Let Δp be the expected shift
in the balance of power:
Δp ≡ λA(1− λB)[p10 − p00] + (1− λA)λB[p01 − p00] + λAλB[p11 − p00] (1)
This expected shift takes into account that, in the next period, A could acquire the technol-
ogy, B could, or both could simultaneously. It can be thought of as a measure of asymmetry
in the possible futures. If Δp = 0, then the future is perfectly balanced; neither player
expects an advantage. However, if Δp > 0, then the future is expected to beneﬁt A, and
vice versa. The further Δp is from zero, the more sharply the future favors one player over
the other.
We will assume that Δp ≤ 0, so that the balance of power is expected to move against
A (perhaps weakly).16 Let V Aij (1) be the value A receives in equilibrium and W
A
ij be the
war value A would receive in the ij subgame, where ij ∈ {01, 10, 11}, when the subgame is
entered with q = 1. Then SAij ≡ V Aij (1)−WAij is the value of the ij subgame over and above
A’s war value in that subgame, given that A starts in possession of the whole stake. We call
this A’s “surplus.”
The values of SAij are determined by Propositions 1 through 3, but we oﬀer a few obser-
16The results are symmetric if we make the opposite assumption.
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vations about these values to guide the intuition. First, all these values are non-negative;
since A can always go to war, he would never accept less than his war value in any subgame.
In fact, if war occurs in the ij subgame, then SAij = 0. By contrast, S
A
ij may be as large as
cA+cB
1−δ if the ij subgame is peaceful and A captures the full surplus from avoiding war for
the rest of the game. In fact, we know from Proposition 1 that SA11 is equal to this upper
bound, because, upon entering this subgame holding the entire stake, A will concede only
enough to make B indiﬀerent between war and peace.
Finally, let SA = λA(1−λB)SA10+(1−λA)λBSA01+λAλBSA11. This is the expected surplus
that A will obtain if a shift occurs in the next round, given that a war does not occur in
this round. It can be thought of as the reward to A from not going to war now. Observe
that SA is smaller when war is more likely to occur in a future subgame—we will use this in
interpreting the following proposition.
Proposition 5. Suppose neither player has the technology and Δp ≤ 0. Then war will occur
if and only if p00 − cA − δ1−δΔp > 1 + δSA.
The proposition shows that whether war occurs depends principally on the relationship
between the expected shift in power Δp and the expected future surplus SA, since these
will dominate the inequality for plausibly high values of the discount factor δ. When Δp
is further from zero, A expects the balance of power to shift more sharply against it. And
when SA is smaller, there is less and less reason to wait to ﬁght, because the future oﬀers A
little more than he would get from ﬁghting then. This is most obviously the case if one or
both of the diﬀusion subgames (where just one player has the technology) result in war—A
receives no surplus in such subgames.
The intuition for this result is that, if the future favors B, B would prefer to do whatever
he can to placate A, including conceding the entire stake, at least until a shift occurs.
However, if the future looks bleak enough for A, then B’s concessions prior to a shift and
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the value of the peace surplus A would expect to capture in the future will not be enough
to stave oﬀ a preventive attack by A. Put another way, the darker the future appears to A,
whether because of a worse expected shift or a higher probability of later war or both, the
more likely it is that A would prefer to ﬁght now.
This shows that the claim made by Levy (1987) and others, that the fear of future war
can be a powerful motive for preventive attack, is right, at least in the context of arms
diﬀusion. A might attack when neither state has the technology, in part because of a fear
that if one or the other state got the technology ﬁrst, it would then ﬁght a war to prevent the
other from succeeding it. Prior models of preventive war did not exhibit this phenomenon
because they assumed that the shifts in the balance of power would always favor a particular
side (Fearon, 1995; Powell, 1999). In equilibrium in these models, the favored side would
have no incentives to launch a war, as it would expect its bargaining position to improve.
As a result, the other side has no rational reason to fear future war. Our model implies
otherwise because it allows for multiple shifts as ﬁrst one side, then the other, obtains the
new technology: opposing shifts create opportunities for both players to face incentives for
preventive attack, and hence to rationally anticipate the possibility of future war.
In fact, any combination of war or peace in the various subgames can occur. Table 1 gives
examples of plausible parameter values that lead to each possible combination of outcomes.
Notice that we can ﬁnd sets of parameter values that lead to war in the introduction subgame
even when one or both diﬀusion subgames are peaceful.
This may seem a strange ﬁnding. Intuitively, we would expect that the most dangerous
times are when one potential belligerent has the technology, but the other does not. The
last three rows in Table 1 show that this is not necessarily the case. In Section 4, we will
argue that this is not an artifact of the model, using the 1967 Six-Day War as an example
in which war occurred before any of the belligerents had a (deliverable) nuclear weapon.
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[Table 1 about here.]
So far we have assumed that the players could conﬁdently predict the eﬀects of the “new”
technology and the likelihood that either would acquire it. This might be the case when the
players anticipate receiving a technology that external actors already possess and have had
a chance to observe the technology in action. These observations would allow them to form
expectations about the eﬀects this technology might have on their situation. For example, we
expect that Israel and Egypt prior to the 1967 War, having seen the eﬀects of the acquisition
of nuclear weapons by several other states, would have reasonable estimates of the eﬀects of
the introduction of nuclear weapons on the balance of power between them.
However, when players cannot observe the technology before acquiring it, they will likely
be substantially uncertain about what it is and what its eﬀects might be. At the opposite
extreme to the conﬁdent forecasting assumed above, players may have little idea about what
technology lies around the corner. We can model this as though there is a space of possible
technologies, each deﬁned by a particular set of parameter values for λA, p10, and so on, and
a distribution over these technologies that determines which is going to be discovered next.
A variant of our model, in which the introduction of new technologies can recur over time
and there is uncertainty about what technology comes next, is discussed in the appendix.
Here, we sketch the intuition behind the main results.
Technologies that are highly consequential, in the sense of having large eﬀects on the
balance of power between two states, are rare. The “next” technology is much more likely
to have modest eﬀects on the balance of power, insuﬃcient to cause war regardless of who
has it and who doesn’t. Thus, the expected value of Δp over the distribution of technologies
is relatively close to zero and, by Proposition 5, war will not occur. (Note that if Δp is close
enough to zero, the inequality in the proposition cannot be satisﬁed.) To put it in terms of
one of our illustrative cases, suppose (counterfactually) that Israel and Egypt did not know
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that the “next” technology was nuclear weapons, or had some inkling of this but had not
learned from observing previous proliferation what the eﬀects on their own balance of power
would be. Without any other information, they would likely assume that the eﬀect of the
next technology would be modest, since this is true for most new technologies, and hence
the potential for either to acquire a new technology would not be enough to cause war.
This reﬁnes the intuition that preventive wars launched prior to either side acquiring a
new technology should be rare. When neither has done so and there is no good information
available about the next technology, uncertainty and the rarity of highly consequential tech-
nologies mean that there is little cause for preventive war. By contrast, when one side has
developed a new technology, both sides can observe it and estimate its eﬀects, and should
those eﬀects be large, war may result as one side tries to defend its monopoly. However, it
may also be the case that, even though neither side has the technology, both know what the
next technology is and that it will have large eﬀects on their balance power. There would
then be substantial incentives for war.
This argument carries implications for the war-proneness of diﬀerent eras. In eras in which
all states (either in the world or in some isolated region) possess roughly similar military
technology, so that diﬀusion of the last highly consequential new technology is complete
and the next new technology is unknown, wars due to the introduction and diﬀusion of
new technologies will be rare. But in eras in which the next technology is known and
consequential, such as the era of the spread of ﬁrearms from Europe or the current era of
nuclear proliferation, wars due to the introduction and diﬀusion of that technology to new
regions will be more common. We will return to this implication in the conclusion, as it
has further ramiﬁcations for understanding the global externalities imposed by competition
among the more technologically-advanced states of the world.
To summarize, we found that war could occur even before either side had the new tech-
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nology, and even if one or both situations where one side had it but the other did not would
be peaceful. The introduction of a new technology is more likely to cause war when states
can conﬁdently estimate its eﬀects, when it is expected to beneﬁt one side asymmetrically,
and when states expect that, upon acquiring the technology ﬁrst, one or both states might
attack the other to preserve its monopoly.
4 Illustrations
Next we oﬀer three examples drawn from the histories of the spread of ﬁrearms and of nuclear
weapons to illustrate the model. The Musket Wars, fought in New Zealand in the early 19th
century after the introduction of ﬁrearms there, demonstrate the most basic intuitions of
the model. The end of the nuclear monopoly, when the United States allowed the Soviet
Union to acquire nuclear weapons without preventive attack, illustrates how a rise in the
probability of acquisition over time can result in peaceful diﬀusion if the acquiring state gets
“lucky” and receives the technology earlier than expected. It also allows us to discuss the
incentives for secrecy with respect to a state’s progress at acquiring a technology. Finally,
the 1967 Six-Day War is used to show that the preventive motivation for war can arise even
when neither side has acquired the technology.
4.1 The Musket Wars
In the early 19th century, the northern coast of New Zealand became a favored stop for
European trading and whaling ships. With more frequent European visits, the Maori tribes
that populated the region began trading with the Europeans, and among other things, these
tribes gained access to muskets for the ﬁrst time in their history (King, 1997; Crosby, 1999).
Equipped with this new technology, the northern tribes started to launch raids against
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the southern tribes that did not possess ﬁrearms. These raids marked the beginning of
the “Musket Wars”, the largest conﬂict ever fought on New Zealand soil (Belich, 1996).
This bloody period of conﬂict lasted almost 30 years, reduced the native population of
New Zealand by more than a quarter according to some estimates, shifted boundaries, and
indirectly paved the way for large-scale European settlement in the 1840s (Belich, 1996;
Crosby, 1999).17
Before the arrival of muskets, violence among Maori tribes was intermittent and of much
lower intensity than that seen during the Musket Wars. Though there were long-term rivalries
between many tribes, these only occasionally resulted in violence, and the clashes were
usually localized, took place for short periods during the summer, and in many cases resulted
in very limited casualties (King, 1997; Crosby, 1999). The Musket Wars, on the other hand,
were marked by total warfare between tribes. Diﬀerent periods of the wars witnessed the
rise and dominance of tribes with ﬁrepower – e.g. Ngapuhi, Waitago, and Ngati Toa – in
diﬀerent regions of New Zealand, and the weakening, elimination, or forced migration of
unfortunate neighboring tribes that lacked muskets.
Our model oﬀers a clear explanation for why the northern tribes initiated this bloody
warfare. This example corresponds to Case 4 in our Table 1, where acquisition of a new
technology by a group creates a commitment problem with other groups that have not
yet received the technology, and a preventive war results. In the Maori case, the selective
diﬀusion of muskets resulted in a big shift in the balance of power relative to indigenous
weaponry, and made the tribes equipped with muskets willing to launch a preventive war
against those tribes that lacked the technology. In particular, the shift in the balance of
capabilities was seen as temporary, as the tribes possessing ﬁrearms expected the other
tribes to gain access to these weapons very soon, knowing that the Europeans would explore
17For diﬀerent estimates of Maori population decline after contact with the Europeans, see Pool (1977;
1991).
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other opportunities for trade. This exacerbated the commitment problem, because the tribes
with the muskets anticipated that, if they waited, their advantage would be lost and the
opportunity it presented squandered. Attacking the tribes that lacked muskets was seen as
a low-cost, eﬀective strategy to maximize their long-term share of the existing resources on
the island.18 In our model’s terms, λAB(p10 − p11) was high enough relative to the size of
the per period surplus from peace, cA + cB, so that it did not make sense for the tribes
with ﬁrearms to agree to any concession: instead they sought to eliminate or conquer and
enslave their opponents.19 Thus, our model suggests that the Musket wars were preventive
in nature, as the high chance that other tribes of the island would soon acquire this weapon
gave the already-armed tribes strong incentives to stop this shift in power from happening.
4.2 The End of the Atomic Monopoly
The Soviet Union’s successful development of nuclear weapons, less than ﬁve years after the
ﬁrst appearance of that technology in war, fundamentally altered the course of the nascent
Cold War, ending the US nuclear monopoly and resulting in 40 years of nuclear-enforced
stalemate between the superpowers. At least in hindsight, the case for the US to launch
a preventive war—before the Soviet Union could get nuclear weapons—seems substantial
(Quester, 2000). So why didn’t it? The answers debated in the literature focus mainly on
the perceived costs of preventive war, but our model suggests an additional factor, rooted
18Using muskets to ﬁght an enemy that lacked muskets did not require close contact with the enemy, and
therefore reduced the cost of ﬁghting for the attacker. Secondly, trade with the Europeans also introduced
potatoes to the island as a durable food source, which made long range raids across the island less costly.
19One can also argue that it was probably not only their fear of other tribes gaining access to muskets,
but also the additional uncertainty arising from the possibility of other, known or unknown, more advanced
technologies being introduced to the island in the future by outsiders. Before their encounters with the
Europeans, these tribes did not have any reasons to expect such changes, and λA and λB were practically
zero. Once the possibility of large shifts became evident with the introduction of muskets, however, they now
had to consider the possibility of other technologies entering the island in the future, changing the balance.
In fact, during the later years of the Musket Wars, small cannons were used by some of the tribes. Some
tribes also conﬁscated or rented European ships to use in their raids to other islands, or used European
mercenaries in their raids (Crosby, 1999).
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in uncertainty about how fast nuclear technology would diﬀuse, that might explain the US
hesitation.
Historians have documented serious consideration at high levels in the Truman adminis-
tration of a preventive attack on the Soviet Union.20 Two explanations are commonly given
for why the US elected not to do so. First, Buhite and Hamel (1990), Debs and Monteiro
(2010), and Trachtenberg (1988, 2007) argue that, at the time, the US perceived the material
costs of a preventive war to be so high that it would rather tolerate the certain loss of its
monopoly than ﬁght to preserve it. The crux of these arguments is that, in the critical period
from 1945 to 1949, the US was ill-prepared to ﬁght a war against the USSR: it had demobi-
lized most of its military, especially in Europe where the USSR could retaliate devastatingly
against a preventive attack; its nuclear stockpile and delivery capabilities were too small to
cover the large Soviet target set; and it lacked the intelligence necessary to enable a more
surgical preventive strike on the Soviet nuclear program. Thus, preventive war was just too
expensive to be worthwhile.
While it is undoubtedly true that the lack of US preparations increased the material
costs of ﬁghting a preventive war, these arguments raise the question of why the US was
so unprepared (Quester, 2000, ch. 2). When, in the aftermath of the Soviet nuclear test
and soon after the start of the Korean War, the US commenced a military buildup, it was
able greatly to strengthen its conventional forces in Europe and elsewhere and to expand its
nuclear arsenal in just two years (Silverstone, 2007; Trachtenberg, 1988). This buildup could
have been implemented over 1946–8, rather than 1950–2, if the US had chosen to do so, and
would have substantially reduced the material costs of preventive war discussed above.
Following this line of reasoning, Quester (2000) and Silverstone (2007) argue that the
material costs of preventive war are not suﬃcient to explain US hesitation. They oﬀer an
20See Buhite and Hamel (1990), Quester (2000, ch. 4), Silverstone (2007, ch. 2), and Trachtenberg (1988,
2007).
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alternative explanation based on the moral costs of preventive war. According to this theory,
American ideals at the time were inconsistent with an unprovoked attack on the Soviet Union
that would likely result in the deaths of millions of civilians, and US decision-makers believed
that the US public would therefore not support a preventive war, regardless of the strategic
arguments for it.
Our model, like other models of shifting power in international relations, suggests that
an examination of the costs of a preventive war, whether material or moral, may not suﬃce
to explain the occurrence or absence of such a war, and by extension, of preparations for
the war. Rather, whether war occurs depends not only on the costs of the war but also
on expectations about the size, direction, and likelihood of future changes in the balance of
power. Our model is unique in allowing us to analyze the incentives for war when there is
uncertainty about when the balance will change.
There was widespread agreement on the part of US policy-makers that the arrival of a
Soviet nuclear capability would eliminate a substantial US advantage, exacerbate US con-
ventional weakness in Europe, and expose the US itself to the risk of a devastating surprise
attack (Richelson, 2007; Silverstone, 2007; Trachtenberg, 1988). To put it in terms of our
model, the perceived diﬀerence between p10, the status quo balance of power, and p11, the new
balance that would obtain if a shift to nuclear bipolarity occurred, was large. Proposition 2
demonstrates that this heightens the incentives for preventive war.
Gordin (2009) and Richelson (2007) document great uncertainty on the part of the US
as to when the Soviet Union would acquire the bomb. The US was deeply surprised by the
ﬁrst Soviet test.21 The consensus estimates of the US intelligence community, through the
21We focus on the period up until the ﬁrst Soviet test as the clearest illustration of the model. The
moment just after the Soviet Union had acquired the technology, but before it had weaponized and deployed
it, might seem an opportune one for preventive attack. However, this vulnerability was recognized, and it
was for precisely this reason that the test was delayed until the Soviet Union had suﬃcient ﬁssile material for
additional bombs (Quester, 2000, p. 133). Thus, we treat the US detection of the Soviet test in September
of 1949 as the moment at which a large shift in p occurred. This is consistent with our model, which assumes
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middle and late 1940s, asserted that the USSR would most likely test a weapon by 1953,
with a low probability of a test occurring in 1952 or 1951; other inﬂuential analysts argued
for much later dates. According to Gordin and Richelson, the error derived from exceedingly
spotty information on the progress of the Soviet program, from ignorance of the degree of
penetration of the US nuclear establishment by Soviet spies, and from a mistaken belief on
the part of some analysts that the US had managed to corner the market for ﬁssile material.
This uncertainty can be modeled according to the cumulative diﬀusion model from Sec-
tion 3.3. The US assessed λt, the probability that the USSR would acquire the bomb in year
t, as quite low during 1945–1950 and increasing slowly over 1951–1952, with higher proba-
bility from 1953 on. Proposition 4 suggests that the US could simply have been putting oﬀ
the costs of preventive war until λt was suﬃciently high—that is, until the threat of Soviet
acquisition was closer to imminent.22
Our model thus provides an explanation for why high-level US oﬃcials would advocate a
massive new military build-up only after the ﬁrst Soviet nuclear test (Trachtenberg, 1988).
Before the test occurred, US policy-makers anticipated that the Soviet program was unlikely
to achieve success for several more years. They thus had every reason to delay the large
expenditures necessary to prepare for a war, as the US could count on the Soviets to avoid war
until they had ended the monopoly. A “lucky” break for the USSR, owing to the unexpected
successes of its spies and scientists, surprised the US and motivated many oﬃcials to conclude
that the US had to be prepared for preventive war as well as a conventional defense of Western
Europe (Trachtenberg, 1988). The high costs of such a war, though obvious, were nonetheless
that the change in the balance of power, once it begins, occurs too quickly for a state to preempt the change
once it has been observed.
22While Gordin (2009) endorses the lack of preparedness as the most important factor in explaining the
absence of a US preventive attack, observing that “the hawks never got very far, mostly because the military
never expressed conﬁdence that it had enough troops, planes, or (crucially) bombs actually to ‘knock’ out
the Soviet Union” (pp. 60–61), he also mentions that the “lengthy estimate” of when the Soviet Union would
get the bomb “discourage[d] a preemptive strike. . . ” (p. 87).
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not suﬃciently compelling to merit continued delay of rearmament. Indeed, as noted before,
when the US ﬁnally did initiate a massive military buildup, it arrived at the desired level
of military preparedness in just two years. Thus, there was no need to make preparations
in the late 1940s, when US leaders still thought they had years before the Soviets got the
bomb.
Our analysis also exposes the incentives for the USSR to conceal its progress. If it had
made no eﬀort to do so, the US could have more easily watched its program and might have
attacked just before the USSR’s program was successful, when the urgency of prevention
would be highest. However, since the USSR took great pains to conceal its program, the
US had to rely on highly uncertain estimates of Soviet science and espionage, leading to
imperfect anticipation of the timing of the shift in power. The analysis in Section 3.3 shows
that this reduces the incentives for war. The result was that the Soviets “got lucky” and
were successful before the US expected, surprising it.23
To summarize, the model exposes an additional factor that may explain US hesitation
in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons to the USSR and why the Soviets took care to
conceal their progress.24 The model itself cannot adjudicate between the claim that the high
costs of prevention, moral and/or material, were suﬃcient to cause US reluctance and the
claim that the low US expectations of the speed of nuclear diﬀusion were also necessary. But
23The Soviet campaign of espionage gave the USSR good reason to think that the US estimate of its
progress was lower than its own. If the US was unaware of Soviet spying, it would have a too-low estimate.
If the US was aware, it would be feeding misinformation to the Soviets, which would slow the program down
and thereby lower the US estimate of progress below that of the Soviets. Either way, the USSR had reason
to continue to hide its actual progress.
24We note also that the pattern of concessions between the US and USSR during this period, at least as
described by Trachtenberg (1988, 2007), is consistent with the implications of the model. Before it acquired
nuclear weapons, the USSR was careful to avoid provoking the US to the point of starting a war, even
while it consolidated its control over eastern Europe and even though the US had rapidly demobilized and
removed its forces from western Europe. Once the USSR had deployed its own nuclear weapons, however, it
became much more bellicose in its dealings with the West. Perhaps the clearest example of newfound Soviet
conﬁdence came in the form of approval and material support for North Korea’s invasion of South Korea in
1950, and for its approval of China’s entry into that war later in the year.
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it does show that the evidence typically given for a cost-based explanation for US hesitation
is inconclusive. US lack of preparation for, and willingness to air moral qualms about, a
preventive war is consistent both with an assessment that the costs would be too high, and
with an assessment that it could aﬀord to wait and see how the situation developed.
4.3 The 1967 Six-Day War
Between June 5 and June 10, 1967, Israel fought a short, intense war with Egypt, Syria,
Jordan, and Iraq, in which Israel was eventually victorious, capturing territory from the ﬁrst
three opponents and seriously reducing the military forces of all four. Recent research into
the history of the Six-Day War, based on newly declassiﬁed documents and new revelations
from participants in the war, suggests that Israel’s nuclear weapons program played a more
important role in the origin of the war than was previously appreciated (Ginor and Remez,
2007; Cohen, 2007; Aronson, 2009), especially in explaining the interaction between Israel
and Egypt.25
Aronson (2009) argues that Israel feared Egypt would attempt to use force to delay or end
its nuclear program, and interpreted Egyptian troop movements into the Sinai on the eve of
the war as a prelude to preventive attack. According to Ginor and Remez (2007), the Soviet
Union supported Egypt and was determined to stop the Israeli nuclear program, even ﬂying
strike reconnaissance missions over Israel’s nuclear facilities and feeding false information
to Egypt about Israel’s preparations for war in order to incite Egypt to escalate the crisis.
For its part, the United States had been pressuring Israel to forego nuclear weapons, and
Cohen (2007) claims that Israel feared the US would abandon it if it made its pursuit of
weapons unambiguous or otherwise provoked the Arab states. Isolated and threatened, Israel
25Note, however, that many of the claims made in this new strand of historiography of the 1967 War are
controversial among historians. For alternative views, see Popp (2006); Ro’i and Morozov (2008); Laron
(2010). Our intent here is not to adjudicate among these views, but to explore the logic of one view and use
it to illustrate our model.
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launched what it thought was a preemptive attack on Egypt’s air forces in order to avert a
preventive strike on Dimona.
Our model makes plain the strategic basis for Israel’s fears. Both Israel and Egypt had
active nuclear weapons programs in 1967. The unilateral acquisition of nuclear weapons by
either would have substantially shifted the balance of power: for Israel, the weapons would
compensate for its numerical inferiority and lack of strategic depth; for Egypt, they would
lessen the relevance of its technological inferiority. In the model’s terms, both p10 − p00
and p01 − p00 would be large in magnitude. However, Israel’s program had been much
more successful than Egypt’s, and so Israel was much closer to getting the bomb than was
Egypt. In the model, λISR  λEGY . Thus, even if Egypt might derive somewhat greater
advantage from unilateral possession of nuclear weapons than Israel, the large diﬀerence in
the likelihoods of acquisition meant that the expected shift in power Δp strongly favored
Israel. It follows from Proposition 5 that Egypt would face substantial incentives to launch
a preventive attack.
Despite the incentives for war when neither state had nuclear weapons, once Israel had
acquired them, it did not give serious consideration to attacking Egypt to prevent its du-
plication of the technology (Fuhrmann and Kreps, 2010). Egypt signed the Treaty on the
Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons just a year after the war and ceased to pursue nuclear
weapons, rendering such an attack pointless. But even if it had continued its program, its
diﬃculty in securing outside assistance and the parlous state of its ﬁnances after the war
meant that the per-period chance of acquisition would have been very low for a long time
(Einhorn, 2004). Thus, according to Proposition 3, Israel would still have had little reason to
attack. In short, the incentives for war were greater when neither state had nuclear weapons
than when one of them had acquired them.
The model implies, and this example illustrates, a more general danger inherent in the
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diﬀusion of arms. The spread of an existing military technology to new localities can cause
war even before either side has it. It is especially likely to do so when local actors have
observed that the technology was highly consequential in other settings, and when diﬀerences
in outside assistance or technological development make one side much likelier to get the
technology ﬁrst. Both properties held between Egypt and Israel in 1967.
5 Conclusion
Secrecy and diﬀusion of new military technologies remain understudied in the international
relations literature. They are important concepts in understanding how changes in the
balance of power might lead to international conﬂict. The existing literature on this topic
has mainly focused on perfectly anticipated deterministic shifts in the balance of military
capabilities. These models are not adequate in studying the role of secrecy and diﬀusion
of military technologies, as the latter create uncertainties and probabilistic changes in the
balance of power. In this paper, we presented a simple model that examines how secrecy and
diﬀusion shape states’ bargaining and conﬂict behavior by changing the balance of power
stochastically in a repeated interaction. The model helps explain why some technologies’
spread is more war-prone than others, and why in some cases even the possibility of a new
technology that no local state yet possesses might create incentives for war. The model also
shows that the fear of future wars due to the spread of new technologies can motivate wars
in the present.
Parameters in our model capture 1) how likely a new technology is to emerge, indicating
the pace of technological progress and the level of technological sophistication in a given
period; and 2) how fast new innovations diﬀuse to other societies, which is a function of the
level of secrecy, as well as the technological development of other states. These parameters
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in turn inﬂuence states’ expectations about the future balance of military capabilities. We
ﬁnd that war will occur whenever a state expects a large adverse shift in the future balance of
power. This diﬀers from Powell (1999, 2009), which found that wars would occur immediately
prior to large, rapid shifts. Whereas in Powell’s models, one would expect a direct causal link
between wars and major changes in the balance of power, our model predicts that the two
will only be correlated, as the causal link is indirect. In our model, it is not the occurrence
of shifts that matters, but players’ expectations about shifts.
Our results shed new light on a very important shift in the international balance of power
in recent history: the Soviet Union’s successful development of nuclear weapons. We assess
existing explanations in the literature for the United States’ failure to launch a preventive
war against the Soviet Union when the US maintained a nuclear monopoly during 1945–
49. We argue that the evidence provided in the literature to support explanations based
on material or normative costs of prevention are ambiguous, and that these approaches by
themselves can only provide a part of the reason for the lack of prevention. Our alternative
approach emphasizes US expectations about the likelihood and timing of the diﬀusion of
nuclear technology to the Soviet Union, and the US preference to delay a preventive strike
until the Soviet bomb was close enough to being imminent. Thus, our explanation qualiﬁes
and complements the established cost-based explanations in the literature.
Our model indicates that war between two states may occur even when neither state
possesses a new technology that has the potential to shift the balance signiﬁcantly, but one
is more likely to acquire it. More strikingly, periods when no one possesses the technology yet
might be more war-prone than periods when one state has a monopoly over it. The intuition
for this result is that the state less likely to gain access to the new technology might have
strong incentives to prevent the more advanced opponent from acquiring the technology. We
discussed this possibility in the context of the 1967 Six-Day War and argued that Israel’s
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fears about Egypt’s intentions to stop the more advanced Israeli nuclear program played a
role in the initiation of war.
Stepping back from these particular examples, a broader implication of our work is that
competition among the major powers may impose large, indirect negative externalities on
the rest of the world, even aside from the direct eﬀects of colonization, imperialism, and
intervention. The generation and use of new, consequential military technologies by rich,
technologically advanced powers creates new opportunities for arms diﬀusion, which may in
turn disrupt the balance of power among weaker states and so cause preventive wars. The
spread of ﬁrearms, invented in China but developed to fearsome eﬀect by the competing
European powers, contributed to the causes of wars in the pre-colonial world, and it may
still do so today as ever more sophisticated ﬁrearms are introduced to less-developed places.
And the spread of nuclear weapons, invented to end yet another competition among major
powers, contributed to wars in the Middle East and may lead to other wars if proliferation
continues.
These externalities can be exacerbated by the willing transfer of military arms, supplies
and know-how from advanced countries to other states or groups. Israel’s nuclear program
was accelerated thanks to help from France, and Pakistan had help from China. The United
States and Soviet Union routinely helped third-world states obtain advanced conventional
arms. The existing literature on the statistical relationship between (conventional) arms
transfers and conﬂict provides mixed empirical results (Craft and Smaldone, 2002, 2003;
Suzuki, 2007), and scholars note a disconnect between the theory driving these studies and
the literature on war and bargaining (Krause, 2004).26
The comparative statics derived from our analysis help bridge this gap by providing
testable hypotheses about the eﬀects of such transfers. They suggest that the characteristics
26We are not aware of any analysis of the link between nuclear weapons assistance and conﬂict.
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of these transfers will inﬂuence the receiving states’ involvement in conﬂict. First, when
the potential belligerents see a higher probability of outside intervention, the incentives
for the player most likely to be harmed by the intervention to launch a preventive attack
increase. For instance, the entry into negotiations over arms packages by one side may
raise the probability of a shift and thereby lead to an attack by the other. Similarly, when
arms transfers are occurring regularly, sharp discord between the supported player and its
external patron may lead to an increased expectation that the transfers will soon be halted,
encouraging the client to ﬁght now to lock in its current advantage.
Second, the higher the impact of the anticipated transfers on the prior balance, the more
risk there is of war. For instance, a situation in which one belligerent of modest technological
sophistication anticipated transfers from a superpower would be more prone to preventive war
than one in which the external actor was another state of modest development. Similarly,
if one belligerent has become highly dependent on external support for its military, the
incentives for preventive attack if this support might someday evaporate are higher than if
the external support was merely ancillary.
Our analysis yields two recommendations for a powerful state that wishes to avoid causing
wars with its arms transfers. First, if a change in the quantity and quality of arms transfers
is desired, it should be implemented slowly, so that discounting lessens the commitment
problem. Second, signals of future changes in arms transfers should be concealed to the
extent possible, so that the party that will be harmed by a shift will not anticipate it and so
will have less incentive to launch a preventive war. Third, if the other side also has a patron,
alterations in the quality and quantity of its arms transfers should be matched closely, if
possible, to minimize shocks to the balance of power.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. The proof has three steps. First, we demonstrate that no war can occur in an SPE.
Second, we show that there can be no revisions if q ∈ [p11 − cA, p11 + cB]. Finally, we show
that any q outside this range is immediately and permanently revised to the nearer endpoint
of the range.
Suppose by way of contradiction that there is an SPE that features war. In the period
in which war will occur, the players’ equilibrium continuation values are WA11 =
p11−cA
1−δ
and WB11 =
1−p11−cB
1−δ . Observe that if the status quo settlement or an oﬀered revision q ∈
(p11−cA, p11+cB) were accepted instead, then both players would receive more in this period
than they would from war. If this settlement were accepted, each player could assure that his
continuation value in any future round was at least his war value, by rejecting or not oﬀering
any revision—the worst that could happen is that the other player would attack, giving
both their war values. Thus subgame-perfection requires that the oﬀer-receiving player in
this round be willing to accept such a q. But then the oﬀer-making player could do strictly
better than his equilibrium continuation value by oﬀering such a q, so war cannot occur in
equilibrium.
This implies that an SPE of this subgame consists of a sequence of accepted settlements
{q∗0, q∗1, . . . }. We next show that this sequence must be stationary, that is, that q∗i = q∗j for
all i, j, so that there is at most one revision: from q to q∗0.
Observe that, for any t, if q∗t ∈ [p11 − cA, p11 + cB], then A’s continuation value must
be equal to q∗t /(1 − δ). If it is less than this, then A has a proﬁtable deviation wherein A
neither oﬀers nor accepts any revision to q∗t in any future period, and by subgame perfection
B tolerates this deviation because it gives him a continuation value at least equal to his war
value.27 If instead A’s continuation value is greater than q∗t /(1 − δ), then the situation is
reversed and B has a proﬁtable deviation analogous to A’s.
Now, if there is some t for which q∗t ∈ [p11 − cA, p11 + cB] and q∗t 	= q∗t+1, then the player
whose share will be reduced in the transition from t to t+1 should not agree to the change.
Thus, if the sequence of accepted settlements ever enters this range, no further changes can
occur. In particular, if the original status quo q is in this range, there will be no revisions in
equilibrium.
So suppose that q > p11 + cB. Notice that A could obtain a continuation value of
p11+cB
1−δ
by oﬀering or accepting a revision to p11 + cB at the ﬁrst opportunity and then agreeing to
no further revisions. B would have no choice but to tolerate this revision: it is better than
27B could choose to attack when indiﬀerent between war and the settlement, but then A’s proﬁtable
deviation would entail making or accepting a revision slightly more generous to B at the ﬁrst opportunity,
which B would strictly prefer, and then neither accepting nor oﬀering any further revisions. We subsequently
will ignore such indiﬀerence cases when they do not aﬀect the substance of our results.
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war, and delay would only make B worse oﬀ. If, for any t, q∗t < p11 − cA, then B would
have an analogous option, which would leave A with a continuation value of at most p11−cA
1−δ ,
so A would never oﬀer or accept a revision in the range (0, p11 + cB). Since, by the ﬁrst
step in the proof, war cannot occur in equilibrium, B’s continuation value in the ﬁrst period
must be at least his war value, 1−p11−cB
1−δ . Since revisions to something less than p11 + cB are
unacceptable to A, this implies that q∗0 must be equal to p11 + cB.
A similar argument for the case when q < p11 − cA completes the proof.
The continuation values for A and B of this subgame, as a function of the status quo
settlement q, follow immediately from Proposition 1, and will be used in the proofs of the
other propositions. They are:
V A11(q) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
p11−cA
1−δ if q ≤ p11 − cA
q
1−δ if p11 − cA < q < p11 + cB
p11+cB
1−δ if p11 + cB ≤ q
(2)
V B11 (q) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
1−p11+cA
1−δ if q ≤ p11 − cA
1−q
1−δ if p11 − cA < q < p11 + cB
1−p11−cB
1−δ if p11 + cB ≤ q
(3)
Notice that both functions are continuous and (weakly) monotonic in all the variables
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. There are three steps. First, we show that the condition above is suﬃcient to guar-
antee war in any SPE. Next, we show that it is also necessary. Finally, we establish that at
most one, immediate revision can occur.
Let WA10 =
p10−cA
1−δ and W
B
10 =
1−p10−cB
1−δ be the players’ continuation values for war in this
subgame. Let V A10(q) be the continuation value for player A of a peaceful settlement q that
is immediately agreed and lasts until B receives the technology, and V B10 (q) similarly for B.
The former is given by the recursive equation:
V A10(q) = q + δ
[
λABV
A
11(q) + (1− λAB)V A10(q)
]
(4)
⇒ V A10(q) =
q + δλABV
A
11(q)
1− δ(1− λAB) (5)
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Similarly, we have:
V B10 (q) =
1− q + δλABV B11 (q)
1− δ(1− λAB) (6)
Notice that V A10(1) is the maximum continuation value that A could possibly receive
starting from the diﬀusion subgame. It entails B conceding the whole stake to A in the
current period, and in every subsequent period until B receives the technology, at which
point the outcome is as prescribed by Proposition 1. If V A10(1) < W
A
10, then there is no way
A can be satisﬁed in this subgame, so A will immediately attack in any SPE. Substituting
the value of V A11(1) from (2) into (5) and rearranging this inequality, we obtain the condition
for war given in the proposition, and suﬃciency is proven.
To see necessity, suppose that V A10(1) ≥ WA10. We will show that this implies the existence
of a settlement that both players would prefer to war. First observe that:
V A10(0) =
δλABV
A
11(q)
1− δ(1− λAB) =
δλAB(p11 − cA)
(1− δ)(1− δ(1− λAB)) <
p11 − cA
1− δ <
p10 − cA
1− δ = W
A
10 (7)
Next notice from (5) that V A10 is continuous and strictly increasing in q. If the value of this
function is (weakly) above WA10 at q = 1 and below it at q = 0, then by the Intermediate
Value Theorem there must be some q∗ ∈ [0, 1] such that V A10(q∗) = WA10. Finally, observe
that:
V A10(q) + V
B
10 (q) =
1 + δλAB
[
V A11(q) + V
B
11 (q)
]
1− δ(1− λAB) =
1 + δλAB
[
1
1−δ
]
1− δ(1− λAB) =
1
1− δ (8)
This implies that V B10 (q
∗) = 1
1−δ −WA10 = 1−p10+cA1−δ > 1−p10−cB1−δ = WB10. Thus, both A and B
would prefer settling at q∗ to war.
Since V B10 is continuous and strictly decreasing in q, the same arguments as in the proof
of Proposition 1 can be used to show that war cannot occur, and that the unique equilibrium
outcome has at most one revision, which is made immediately.
It is easy to derive the continuation values of this game for both players, as a function
of the status quo q. If the condition in Proposition 2 is met, the players receive their war
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values. Otherwise, their values are:
V A10(q) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
p10−cA
1−δ if q ≤ q∗
q
1−δ if q
∗ < q ≤ p11 + cB
q+δλAB
p11+cB
1−δ
1−δ(1−λAB) if p11 + cB < q < q
∗∗
p10+cB
1−δ if q
∗∗ ≤ q
(9)
V B10 (q) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
1−p10+cA
1−δ if q ≤ q∗
1−q
1−δ if q
∗ < q ≤ p11 + cB
1−q+δλAB 1−p11−cB1−δ
1−δ(1−λAB) if p11 + cB < q < q
∗∗
1−p10−cB
1−δ if q
∗∗ ≤ q
(10)
Here q∗ is deﬁned, uniquely since V A11 is continuous and strictly increasing in q, by:
q∗ + δλABV A11(q
∗)
1− δ(1− λAB) = W
A
10 (11)
That is, q∗ is the lowest share of the contested stake that A would prefer taking over going
to war. Similarly, q∗∗ is the settlement at which B would be indiﬀerent between war and
peace, and is uniquely deﬁned by:
1− q∗∗ + δλABV B11 (q∗∗)
1− δ(1− λAB) = W
B
10 (12)
Both functions are continuous and strictly monotonic in q. We will these values to induce
the equilibria for the prior subgame in which neither player has the technology.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. Observe ﬁrst that for t ≥ n, λt is constant, so the game is identical to the subgame
analyzed in the previous section and the claim follows immediately from Proposition 2. We
next prove by induction that the maximum value A can obtain from peace in equilibrium is
strictly decreasing in t up to period n; since A’s value from war does not change prior to B
acquiring the technology, the claim follows.
By arguments like those in the proof of Proposition 2, the best A can do from peace in
equilibrium is to receive the whole stake until B gets the technology, after which A’s value
is determined by Proposition 1. The value of this at time t ∈ {0, . . . , n − 1} is deﬁned by
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the following set of simultaneous recursive equations:
{
V At (1) = 1 + δ
[
λtV
A
11(1) + (1− λt)max
{
WA10, V
A
t+1(1)
}]}
t∈{0,...,n−1} (13)
with boundary condition V An (1) =
1+δλnV A11(1)
1−δ(1−λn) , taken from Proposition 2.
First we show that V An (1) < V
A
n−1(1). Re-arranging (13) using the boundary condition,
we have:
V An−1(1) ≥ V An (1) +
δ(λn − λn−1)
[
1− (1− δ)V A11(1)
]
1− δ(1− λn) (14)
Because V A11(1) <
1
1−δ , the second term on the right-hand side is strictly positive and so
V An (1) < V
A
n−1(1). This establishes the base case. For the induction step, we assume that
V Ai+1(1) < V
A
i (1) and show that this implies that V
A
i (1) < V
A
i−1(1). We have:
Δi = V
A
i−1(1)− V Ai (1) = δ
[
λi−1V A11(1) + (1− λi−1)max
{
WA10, V
A
i (1)
}]
− δ [λiV A11(1) + (1− λi)max{WA10, V Ai+1(1)}] (15)
There are four cases to consider, arising from the maxima in (15):
1. Both maxima are equal to WA10. Then (15) simpliﬁes to δ(λi − λi−1)
[
WA10 − V A11(1)
]
,
which is positive since λi > λi−1 and WA10 − V A11(1) = p10−cA−p11−cB1−δ > 0 under the
supposition given in the proposition.
2. The maxima are V Ai (1) and V
A
i+1(1). Using the induction supposition that Δi+1 > 0,
it follows that Δi > δ(λi − λi−1)
[
V Ai+1(1)− V A11(1)
]
, which is positive since V Ai+1(1) ≥
WA10 > V
A
11(1).
3. The maxima are V Ai (1) and W
A
10. It follows that Δi > δ(λi − λi−1)
[
WA10 − V A11(1)
]
,
which is positive by Case 1.
4. The maxima are V Ai+1(1) and W
A
10. This contradicts the induction supposition that
Δi+1 > 0.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. We begin by calculating the continuation value for A of an immediately agreed set-
tlement q that lasts until a player receives the technology, as follows:
V A00(q) = q + δ
[
(1− λA)(1− λB)V A00(q) + λA(1− λB)V A10(q) + (1− λA)λBV A01(q) + λAλBV A11(q)
]
⇒ V A00(q) =
q + δ
[
λA(1− λB)V A10(q) + (1− λA)λBV A01(q) + λAλBV A11(q)
]
1− δ(1− λA)(1− λB) (16)
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War is certain to occur if its value for A exceeds the best A could possibly obtain from
peace, or WA00 =
p00−cA
1−δ > V
A
00(1). Substituting from (16) and re-arranging, we obtain the
inequality in the statement of the proposition and suﬃciency is proven. Necessity follows
from arguments very similar to those used to show necessity in the proof of Proposition
2.
A.5 Recurring Diﬀusion with Multiple Technologies
The model presented in the paper has focused on the role of only one technology that, once
acquired, creates a perfectly anticipated shift in the balance of military capabilities. Once
both states receive this technology, there are no further changes to the balance of power. We
now investigate if our results extend to the case of multiple technologies with varying eﬀects
on the balance of power and uncertainty about which technology becomes available next.
To make the analysis tractable, we simplify the bargaining protocol by focusing on a
take-it-or-leave-it structure with probabilistically alternating oﬀers. At the beginning of
each period, with probability m, A makes an oﬀer (xt, 1 − xt) for the division of the pie,
and B can either accept this oﬀer without any revisions, or reject it. With probability 1-m,
B makes the oﬀer instead. Rejection of an oﬀer results in war. We still model war as a
costly lottery: in any period, the probability that A wins the war is denoted by pt, and B’s
probability is 1− pt.
We consider the eﬀect of shifts in pt due to the diﬀusion of new technologies on states’
conﬂict behavior. Assume that, in the beginning of each bargaining round, with probability
λ, a new technology becomes available to one or both players the balance parameter pt
changes. More formally, with probability λ, Nature draws pt from a continuous probability
distribution function f(pt), deﬁned over pt ∈ [0, 1] with mean p and cumulative distribution
function F (pt), which is continuous and strictly increasing. We refer to p as the “long term
balance” parameter.
We restrict our attention to stationary subgame perfect equilibria (SSPE) in which states’
strategies only depend on the balance parameter and who makes the oﬀer in a given period.
In any peaceful round of a SSPE, the state making the oﬀer makes the minimum feasible
oﬀer that gives the other side at least its war payoﬀ. Second, in any SSPE, states use simple
cutpoint strategies to attack that are conditional on the balance of power parameter. The
attacking decision is monotonic in pt: if a state attacks for a given pt, the state also attacks
for any p∗t that makes the state stronger. Third, the order of play in a given bargaining
round does not aﬀect states’ equilibrium cutpoints for ﬁghting in an SSPE.28
The SSPE will be characterized by four cutpoints:
• p represents the balance parameter at which B is indiﬀerent between accepting the
28We do not provide the proofs of these results for space reasons. They are available from the authors
upon request.
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whole pie versus rejecting it and going to war. Below this cutpoint, B will require an
oﬀer giving B more than the whole pie, which is not feasible, and war will result.
• p∗B is relevant when B is making the ﬁrst oﬀer. At this cutpoint, B receives the whole
pie, and all the eﬃciency gain from avoiding war goes to B. Between this cutpoint and
p, B is still willing to avoid war by accepting the whole pie, but some of the surplus
from avoiding war goes to A.
• p∗A is relevant when Nature chooses A to make the ﬁrst oﬀer. At this cutpoint, A
receives the whole pie, and all the eﬃciency gain from avoiding war goes to A. Between
this cutpoint and p¯, A is still willing to avoid war by accepting the whole pie, but some
of the surplus from avoiding war goes to B.
• At p¯, A is indiﬀerent between receiving the whole pie or going to war. At this cutpoint,
B receives the whole eﬃciency gain. When pt > p¯, A prefers war in equilibrium.
The cutpoints p and p¯, are illustrated in Figure 2, where the balance parameter is drawn
from a unimodal distribution. As the ﬁgure shows, for small enough pt, B cannot be bought
oﬀ in equilibrium, and for large enough pt, A prefers attacking to accepting x = 1. In other
words, it is preferable for states to take advantage of a favorable balance of capabilities by
attacking the other side and thereby ending the game.
Assuming that both players attack for some values of pt in equilibrium, the equilibrium
cutpoints must satisfy the following system of equations:29
1 + δλ(1−p−cB
1−δ +mSA + (1−m)(QP − SB))
1− δ(1− λ) =
1− p− cB
1− δ (17)
1 + δλ(1−p−cB
1−δ +mSA + (1−m)(QP − SB))
1− δ(1− λ) = E(V )−
p∗B − cA
1− δ (18)
1 + δλ(p−cA
1−δ +m(QP − SA) + (1−m)SB)
1− δ(1− λ) = E(V )−
1− p∗A − cB
1− δ (19)
1 + δλ(p−cA
1−δ +m(QP − SA) + (1−m)SB)
1− δ(1− λ) =
p¯− cA
1− δ (20)
29The equilibrium conditions when p ≤ 0 or p¯ ≥ 1 can be speciﬁed similarly by replacing the war indif-
ference equation for the peaceful player with an inequality and his war cutpoint with 0 (for B) or 1 (for
A).
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where
P = F (p¯)− F (p)
Q =
cA + cB
1− δ(1− λ(1− (F (p¯)− F (p))))
E(V ) =
1− cA − cB
1− δ +Q
SA =
∫ p¯
p∗A
pt − p∗A
1− δ f(pt)dpt
SB =
∫ p∗B
p
p∗B − pt
1− δ f(pt)dpt.
P is the equilibrium probability of peace. Q is the expected total surplus from avoiding
war. This surplus increases as the probability of peace increases in the future. If there is
no ﬁghting in equilibrium, Q = cA+cB
1−δ . As the values of pt that make war inevitable become
more probably, however, this surplus shrinks. E(V) is the total expected value of the game.
If there is no ﬁghting in equilibrium, E(V ) =
∑∞
i=1 δ
i−1 = 1
1−δ . SA is the part of the future
surplus B expects to receive when A makes the ﬁrst oﬀer. When A is making oﬀers, B
receives more than its war payoﬀ only when the balance parameter is between p∗A and p¯, and
when pt = p¯, B receives all the eﬃciency gain from avoiding war. Similarly, SB is the part
of the surplus A expects to receive when B makes the oﬀers.
The non-linear system of four equations above, characterizing states’ equilibrium cut-
points, does not have a closed-form solution. To show that a SSPE exists, and to evaluate
the comparative statics of the parameters of interest, we use computer simulations to ﬁnd a
solution to this system for diﬀerent combinations of m, λ, δ, cA, and cB.
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[Figure 2 about here.]
As in our previous model, we ﬁnd that states’ incentives to attack their opponent increase
if they view a favorable balance as only temporary. How long the favorable balance will last
in expectation is a function of λ. When λ is smaller, states expect a given balance to last for
more periods. In contrast, larger λ indicates that a favorable pt is only temporary and it is
highly likely that in the future periods the balance will shift back to its long-term expectation
value p. Thus, the range of pt values that result in peace shrinks as λ increases.
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30We consider m = {0, .1, .5, .9, 1}, λ = {0, .1, .2, . . . , .9, 1}, δ = {.1, .2, . . . , .8, .9}, cA =
{0, .025, .05, . . . , .225, .25}, and cB = {0, .025, .05, . . . , .225, .25}. We also consider the Uniform and various
unimodal and bimodal Beta distributions deﬁned over the [0,1] interval. For each parameter conﬁguration,
our simulations ﬁnd solutions to the nonlinear system of equations using the BB package in R. To check if
there are multiple equilibria, we used 150 diﬀerent random starting vectors for each case. In each parameter
speciﬁcation we considered, our simulations returned a unique solution to the system, suggesting a unique
stationary equilibrium. The simulation code and data are available upon request.
31Not surprisingly, we ﬁnd the same comparative statics results on δ, cA, and cB . While larger δ decrease
the range of pt that result in peace, larger cA and cB make peace more likely.
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The distribution of future shifts plays an important role in the likelihood of conﬂict. It
factors into states’ strategies through three mechanisms: ﬁrst, the mean of the distribution
determines the long term balance between the states and whether the balance in a given
period is favorable or not compared to the expected balance in the future. Second, the
distribution determines how likely war is in the future, and hence the expected total future
value of the game. Finally, it also aﬀects how much of the surplus is expected to go to which
state during future peaceful rounds. Overall, distributions that make realizations of larger
pt more likely represents a more favorable future for A. Thus, draws of pt favorable to B are
more likely to induce B to attack, as they represent temporary windows of opportunity for B
before an expected shift back to a more favorable balance for A. The commitment problem
is more severe in trying to compensate B for unfavorable future rounds. A, in contrast,
does not have strong incentives to attack expect perhaps for very high values of pt. This is
because in the future A expects the balance to stay in his favor.
Finally, the parameter m, the probability that Nature chooses A instead of B to make the
take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer in a given period, captures the level of bargaining advantage A has
over B. Both players prefer making oﬀers during the bargaining rounds, because the player
making the oﬀer will try to make the minimum feasible oﬀer that gives the other player at
least its war payoﬀ, and keep to himself the rest of the surplus. As m increases, A has more
of this advantage. As m increases, both states’ cutpoints increase. This is because, with
higher m, the future is not as favorable to B and war in this round becomes more attractive.
Conversely, A needs more extreme values of pt in this period to initiate a war and forego an
expected favorable future.
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Parameter Values Subgame Outcomes
Case λA λB λAB λBA p00 p10 p01 p11 Introduction A has it B has it
1 .1 .1 .25 .25 .5 .75 .25 .5 Peace Peace Peace
2 .1 .1 .2 .15 .5 .9 .25 .35 Peace War Peace
3 .1 .1 .2 .2 .5 .75 .1 .7 Peace Peace War
4 .1 .1 .2 .2 .5 .9 .1 .5 Peace War War
5 .1 .2 .3 .25 .6 .85 .15 .5 War War War
6 .2 .05 .25 .1 .3 .8 .1 .6 War Peace War
7 .1 .25 .3 .15 .7 .8 .2 .35 War War Peace
8 .01 .25 .3 .05 .6 .9 .1 .7 War Peace Peace
Table 1: Example Parameter Values and Equilibrium Outcomes in Subgames (δ=.9, cA =
cB = .1)
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Figure 1: Gradually Increasing λt and Delayed Attack
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Figure 2: States’ Equilibrium Cutpoints in the Recurring Diﬀusion Model
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